The “Iran nuclear deal” is much bigger than Iran’s nuclear program

The ongoing talks between Iran and several world powers aimed at restoring the 2015 nuclear accord have been centred on technical and legal issues ranging from the enrichment of uranium to the lifting of economic sanctions. The United States, having exited the agreement in 2018, is actively negotiating its re-entry, and European officials have hinted that a deal is within reach. Recalling the military brinkmanship that led to the tragic downing of Flight 752 in January 2020, one can particularly appreciate the Biden administration’s return to a diplomatic approach to Tehran.

But the recent spate of clashes between U.S. military forces in Iraq and Syria and local militias aligned with Iran paint a different picture. The militias, formed by religious decree to counter the expansion of Isis and later incorporated into the Iraqi state, have also received significant support from Iran’s government. Since the Trump administration ramped up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran in 2018 and ordered the assassination of Iran’s top general Qassem Soleimani last year, proxy attacks on U.S. forces have intensified, and the region has once again become engulfed in a shadow war between Iran and the United States.

A U.S. return to the 2015 nuclear deal would certainly alleviate this situation. When implemented, the agreement significantly constraints and monitors Iran’s nuclear program. For this to take place, the United States must remove nuclear-related restrictions on Iran’s economy and provide assurances of its lasting commitment to the deal. Perhaps then, with American and Iranian negotiators once again seated at the same table, a dialogue of words may resume.

Since it was first announced in 2015, the nuclear accord has taken on many lifeforms. Originally designed as an arms control agreement to address international concerns over Tehran’s nuclear program, negotiations over the deal facilitated bilateral talks between Iran and the United States for the first time in decades. Declared as a landmark diplomatic achievement for the Obama administration, the agreement was voided by President Trump for political gain at home. Around the world, the few critics of the agreement gathered to push for a “bigger, better deal”, leaving war and regime change as the likely alternatives.

In Tehran, once seen as a harbinger of a new chapter of relations with the West, the deal’s botched implementation has instead validated distrust for the United States. President Rouhani’s earlier calls on engaging Western firms and the need to de-securitize Iran’s political economy now seem like a distant memory. The experience of the last four years has hardened Iran’s security establishment, and helped result in last month’s less than competitive presidential elections.

Iran’s incoming president has openly supported the nuclear deal, but is more likely to pursue a policy of reconciliation with Riyadh than with Washington. Despite the serious challenges facing Iran’s political class, including climate change and ongoing labour strikes, Tehran is more wary than ever of depending on Western assistance. Rather than loosening economic restrictions in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic last spring, the United States made it harder for humanitarian aid to reach Iranians.

In the event that sanctions on Iran are lifted later this year, Western companies will likely take a backseat to Chinese and Russian investors. Together with Moscow and Beijing, Tehran views the Trump administration’s inability to unravel the agreement as a sign of America’s waning political authority, and is likely to orient its fortunes accordingly. For these U.S. adversaries, despite their own motivations behind the nuclear deal, Washington’s abuse of its financial prowess has reached a tipping point.

Six years on, a rigorously orchestrated exercise in nuclear diplomacy between Washington and Tehran has become yet another political standoff with global ramifications. The nuclear deal with Iran is now much bigger than Iran’s nuclear program.

* Pitch rejected by The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star.